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THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF
WATER QUALITY PROTECTION IN CHINA
W. Scott Railton
Abstract: With the majority of its freshwater sources polluted, and the pursuant
incurrence of significant economic losses, and substantial health risks, China has
reached a critical stage in its water resource management. Past efforts to legislate for
water quality protection, although promising in content, have been less than effective.
Four modes of enforcement-administrative controls, economic incentives, legal
responsibility, and campaigns-have achieved only moderate success. This Comment
examines the statutory and regulatory framework for water pollution control in China
and suggests that if China's water pollution controls are ever to be more than mere
rhetoric, China must focus on eliminating conflicts of interest amongst regulators; take
an absolutist rather than economic incentive based approach to pollution control; and
provide sufficient funding for remedial actions while limiting future costs through
increased conservation and public participation in water resource protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
China has reached a critical stage in water management planning.
Increasing awareness of the harmful effects of pollution has engendered
great health and economic concerns in the mainland. Approximately
eighty percent of China's fresh water bodies are polluted.' Over one
hundred million tons of sewage is discharged in China daily.2 Over thirty
percent of industrial wastewaters and eighty percent of municipal
wastewaters return untreated into China's waterways.3 Making matters
worse, preexisting and newly formed pollution management regimes have
been unable to halt the degradation in the face of China's double-digit
annual economic growth.4 In fact, top government officials such as
President Jiang Zemin and former Premier Li Peng have openly
1 Wither China's Environment?, CHINA Bus. REV., July-Aug., 1994, at 24. Another source reports
that 86 percent of China's fresh waters are polluted. Polluter Beware, ASIA L., Mar. 1996, at 8, 12.
National pollution statistics are a recent development in China. Most monitoring networks were formed
in the 1980s, which makes the exactitude of reported figures questionable. However, the weight of
authority strongly suggests a severe water pollution problem in both urban and rural regions of China.
RICHARD EDMONDS, PArrERNS OF CHINA's LOST HARMONY 3, 133-41 (1994).
2 China Faces Serious Water Crisis, XINHUA, July 21, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Allows file.
3 Id. See also Wither China's Environment?, supra note 1, at 24.
4 Rone Tempest, Is Pollution The Price of Asia's Development?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994,
World Report, at 9.
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acknowledged that environmental conditions are worsening, despite all
current efforts to combat pollution.5
The health and well-being of a large number of Chinese are
threatened daily by the decline in water quality. One survey found that
drinking water met state standards in only six of the twenty-seven largest
cities in China. 6  Even worse, only four of these cities complied with the
state groundwater standards.7 Reported cases of stomach, liver, and
esophagus cancers are three to ten times more common in polluted areas
than in non-polluted areas. 8 China's two leading infectious diseases are
waterborne hepatitis and dysentery.9 Moreover, the increased use of
fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides has contributed to excess nitrate
levels within water bodies, thereby significantly raising the risk of blue-
baby syndrome for infants.' 0 Crops have been found to contain high levels
of toxic metals such as chromium, lead, and cadmium." For many
Chinese citizens, the health hazards of water pollution are nearly
inescapable.
Water pollution is also costly. After including the cost of hospital
stays and lost wages, China's annual cost for hepatitis and dysentery is
estimated between RMB 370 million yuan and RMB 470 million yuan.
12
The cost for vegetable farmers exposed to roundworm and hookworm
' China's Environment Under Siege: Top Leaders, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, July 24, 1997, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws file. President Jiang Zemin has described the situation as "stem," saying that
China has much to accomplish with respect to the envuonment Id Admissions by Chinese officials specifically
as to the water pollution problem ae increasingly common. For instance, Qu Geping, chairman of the National
People's Congress Environmental and Resources Protection Committee has noted that "water pollution...
damage [is] severe .. a.." NU Chenguang, Fighting Pollution Plan for the Greener Future, CHINA DAILY, Dec.
16, 1995, available in 1995 WL 11204711. database. See also Michael Di Cicco, China to Halt Pollution of
Major River, U.P.I., Nov. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws file ("China is acknowledging
its rapid pace of economic growth has left its environment in tatters."); Polluter Beware, supra note 1, at 12
('The Chinese governme .... has voiced its recognition of the huge problems the country faces: 86% of all
available freshwater is said to be contaminated."). See generally Stephen Hucheon, China: Pollution Cisis As
Economy Goes Into Overdrive, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June 5, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc library,
Alinws file.
6 VACLAV SMIL, ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN CHINA: ESTIMATES OF ECONOMIC COSTS 2 (1996).
Id at24.
Id. at 27-28. Water pollution also leads to "liver enlargement, anemia, skin diseases, premature
hair loss, congenital deformities, and waterborne infectious diseases." Id.
9 Id. at27.
1o Blue-baby syndrome, or methemoglobinemia, is a reduction in blood's ability to convey oxygen.
Id. at 25-26.
I d. at 25.
12 Id. at 27.
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from organic wastes in the water is similarly high. 13  Fisheries have
sustained diminishing returns for the last three decades. Decreased water
quality accounts for much of the problem, as the Ministry of Agriculture
estimates that pollution caused $67.5 million in losses to Chinese fisheries
in 1995.14 However, one economist has recently calculated losses as high
as RMB 1.8 billion yuan per year.15  In addition, aesthetic and recreational
losses are less easily valued, but nonetheless real.
Pollution diminishes the possible uses of already scarce water
supplies. China holds only one-fourth the world's average of per capita
water resource availability. 16  Agricultural enterprises sometimes suffer
inadequate water supplies due to metal-heavy water sources. For instance,
many of the tributaries of the Yellow River are polluted to the point that
they are unsuitable for irrigation. 17  Droughts affect crop production on
over twenty million hectacres of farm land each year.' 8  Diminished water
quality only heightens the severity of drought. In some areas, water
shortages can even be life threatening. 19
The Chinese government has made great efforts in recent years to
legislate for the protection, preservation, and enhancement of the
environment, and more particularly, nationwide water quality.
Constitutional provisions, statutes, and regulations have been implemented
to achieve the dual goals of sustainable economic development and a
3 Id. at 27. During the 1980s, 93 to 94 percent of Chinese vegetable farmers were exposed to
roundworm, and 65 percent were exposed to hookworm. Id.
14 Wu Yunhe, Pollution Threatens Fisheries, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 25, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Asiap Library, Allnws file. A survey of China's major rivers found that five percent contained no living
fish. SMIL, supra note 6, at 24. See also Di Cicco, supra note 5 (Huaihe "river's once abundant stock of
fish has been decimated.").
s SMIL, supra note 6, at 26. Vaclav Smil, an environmental economist, estimates that annual losses are
somewhere between 180 and 270 thousand metric tons of fish. Combined with cultured seawater losses, he
estimates monetary losses between RMB 1.1 billion yuan and RMB 1.8 billion yuan per year. Id
16 Water-Control Legislation Accelerated, XINHUA, Dec. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Alnws file. The article also reports that out of five hundred Chinese cities, three hundred suffer water shortages.
One hundred cities suffer serious shortages. Id See also China Faces Serious Water Crisis, supra note 2 ('China
has a water shortage of 30 billion cubic meters for nual areas and 6 billion cubic meters for urban people. By the
year 2000, the country will need at least 60 billion cubic meters more of water."); Liang Chao, 1988 Law on
Water Yields Big Dividends, CHINADAILY, July 5, 1993, available in 1993 WL 100864733 ("With China's rapid
economic development, the shortage of water, particularly freshwater resources,. . will become increasingly
serious," said Niu Maosheng, Minister of the Water Resources). See generally EDMONDS, supra note 1, at 114-
24 (discussing water shortage problems nationally and regionally).
17 Tempest, supra note 4, at 9.
IS China Faces Serious Water Crisiysupra note 2.
'9 Id Rural areas annually experience a water shortage of 30 billion cubic meters. By 2000, it is
estimated that China will need an additional 60 billion cubic meters of water. Id These shortages are life
threatening in regions where the survival environment is deteriorating with land subsidence and cracks. id
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clean, healthy environment. Although China's legislative and regulatory
record is long, the enactments have been largely ineffective. 20 Inadequate
enforcement is frequently offered as a reason for the ineffective water
pollution control.
2 1
This Comment examines China's water policy in light of its water
pollution control record. Section II reviews the water pollution law of
China. Section III examines China's four fundamental water pollution
control enforcement methods-administrative controls, incentive programs,
legal responsibility, and campaigns. Section IV suggests three
overarching policy goals for the improvement of China's water quality.
First, conflicts of interest between environmental protection and economic
growth must be limited. Second, absolutist legal regimes such as
command-and-control approaches should presently be favored over
economic incentive approaches to regulation. Third, the funding for
implementing water clean-up projects should be increased, and future
costs should be minimized through conservation practices and increased
public involvement. The Comment concludes that China's plans for
sustainability will be no more than hollow rhetoric unless national policy-
makers successfully communicate to individuals, businesses, and local
governments that long-term environmental health must be prioritized
above short-term economic gains.
II. THE WATER POLLUTION LAW OF CHINA
Since 1994, there has been a dramatic increase in legislative and
planning activity regarding China's water policy. One official described 1995
as "the Year for Water Law and Regulations."22 Pollution by corporate and
state level institutions has been targeted for correction.2 3 A summary of the
current water protection legal framework follows. First, the role of China's
2o Bryan Bachner, Coming Home To Roost: Pollution, Law and Economics in the People's Republic
of China, 5 GEO. INT'L. ENVTL. L. REv. 635, 644 (1993) [hereinafter Bachner, Coming Home]. See also
supra notes 1-19 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., Bryan Bachner, Regulating Pollution in the People's Republic of China: An Analysis of
the Enforcement of Environmental Law, 7 COLo. J. INT'L. ENvrL. L. & POL'Y 373 (1996) [hereinafter
Bachner, Regulating Pollution]; John Head, Criminal Responsibility Effectiveness and Enforcement, E.
ASIAN EXEC. REP., Nov. 15, 1995 at 9 [hereinafter Head, Criminal Responsibility]; Coming Home, supra
note 20, at 645-46; Hucheon, supra note 5.
22 Liang Chao, Water Day Hails New Rules, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 23, 1995, available in 1995
WL 7963483.
23 Lester Ross, The Next Wave ofEnvironmental Legislation, CHINA Bus. REV., July-Aug., 1994, at 30.
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constitution in environmental law is introduced. Thereafter, the two leading
statutes for water quality protection are reviewed.
A. Constitution
Constitutional law in communist countries differs substantially from
that in Western countries.2 4  The 1982 Constitution of China25 does not
convey the same magnitude of authority and substance as its Western
counterparts.2 6 For example, the Constitution does not provide a means for
citizens to assert constitutional claims.27 The lesser role of the Constitution is
partially explained by China's historical reliance upon local custom and moral
precept for dispute resolution rather than affirmative lawmaking,28 as well as
by the continuing strain between China's legal system and the Communist
Party.29 Nonetheless, the Chinese Constitution is China's most powerful law.
Chinese consider it their "mother law" (mufa), and all other laws are
considered its "children" (zifia), and thus subordinate. 30  The form of the
Chinese Constitution is derived from the Western constitutional model,
however, and therefore has the potential to obtain a similar weight of
authority to Western constitutions in the future.3'
China's Constitution speaks implicitly to water pollution control by
providing the language of protection and guiding principles for environmental
protection. Article Nine establishes the State's duty to conserve natural
resources. It declares, "Appropriation or damage of natural resources by any
24 ALBERT HY CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION To THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, 39-41 (1992).
25 ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [P.R.C. CONST. of 1982], translated in CHINA LAWS
FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS (1997) (compiled by CCH Asia Pacific).
26 CHEN, supra note 24, at 40.
27 William P. Alford & Yuanyuan Sher, Limits of the Law in Addressing China's Environmental
Dilemma, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 128 (1997).
28 Id. at 125.
29 CHEN, supra note 24, at 40. The Communist Party is considered the "sole interpreter and guardian of
the interests of the people and the nation." It has in the past led the masses in a successful revolutior. Tlus,
where conflicts arise between the developing socialist state and the entrenched Communist Party, the
Constitution, and China's other laws may take a back seat to the will of the Communist Party. Id
30 Id. at 45.
31 Id. See also Ross, supra note 23, at 30 (noting a "strong constitutional foundation" for increased
environmental protection through legislation).
32 CHEN, supra note 24, at 41. Chen speaks in general terms about the role of the Constitution.
The general role which the Constitution plays in Chinese society extends to environmental protection
since the Constitution makes specific relevant statements regarding protection. See infra notes 33-37 and
accompanying text.
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organization or individual by whatever means is prohibited., 33  Article Ten
sets forth the duty of individuals and organizations to ensure rational land
use. 34  Article Twenty-Six adds, "The state protects and improves the
environment in which people live and the ecological environment. It prevents
and controls pollution and other public hazards. ' 35 Other provisions such as
Articles Twelve and Twenty-One can be construed as protective of water
resources. Article Twelve states that socialist public property, which
amounts to most real property in China, is inviolable.36 In addition, Article
Twenty-One provides that the health of citizens is the state's responsibility. 37
Despite the empirical evidence to the contrary, these provisions provide a
solid basis for inferring that China's water resources are constitutionally
protected.
B. Statutes
Over the last two decades, several laws have been established to
protect and enhance freshwater resources. 38 The primary laws for freshwater
protection are the Environmental Protection Law ("EPL")39 and the Water
Pollution Prevention and Control Law ("WPL").40  The EPL was originally
drafted in 1979, and was enacted in 1989 after a trial implementation
period.41 Established in 1984, the WPL was significantly amended in 1996.
" P.R.C. CONST. of 1982, art. 9.
14 P.R.C. CONST. of 1982, art. 10.
'5 P.R.C. CONST. of 1982, art. 26.
36 P.R.C. CONST. of 1982, art. 12.
37 P.R.C. CONST. of 1982, art. 21.
" Several laws impact the protection of water resources in varying degrees. Laws relevant to water
quality in China include the Water Law (1988) (P.R.C.), the Water and Soil Conservation Law (1992) (P.R.C.),
and the Flood Prevention Act (1994) (P.R.C.). Other environmental statutes which indirectly impact water
pollution law include the Forestry Law (1984) (P.RC.), the Fisheries Law (1986) (P.R.C.), the Land
Management Law (1988) (P.R.C.), the Agriculture Law (1993) (P.RIC.), and the Solid Waste Law (1996)
(P.R.C.). See generally LESTER Ross & MirrCHELL SIL-, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLUC OF CHINA (1987). Chinese environmental law is currently in transition. New laws as well as
amendments to current environmental statutes are anticipated to further impact water protection efforts. See,
e.g., infra notes 157-59, and accompanying texL See generally Ross, supra note 23,'at 30-33 (discussing
pending changes in Chinese environmental law).
39 ZHONGUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO HUANJING BAOHU FA [Environmental Protection Law of the
People's Republic of China] (1989) (P.R C.) [hereinafter EPL], translated in CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN
BustNEss (1997) (compiled by CCH Asia Pacific).
40 ZHONGHUA REMIN GONGHEGUO SHuIwuRAN FANG ZHI FA [Water Pollution Control Law] (1984)
(P.R.C.) [hereinafter WPLJ, provided by Chinalaw Computer-Assisted Legal Research Center, Peking
University, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Chinal File.
41 BARBARA J. SxNKuIE & LEONARD ORTOLANO, IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL POUICY IN CHINA 5
(1995). The 1989 EPL revises its earlier version in four ways. First, it increases the authority and responsibility
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These recent amendments to the WPL reflect China's increased legislative
efforts to address its diverse environmental problems.42
1. The Environmental Protection Law of China ("EPL ")
The EPL is China's leading statute for environmental protection. It
sets forth broad policy statements concerning the relationship between society
and the environment.43 The law emphasizes several principles.
First, development should be in harmony with environmental
protection. 44 Economic development and environmental protection are not
viewed as adversarial, but rather as a "dialectic unity. ' 5 Article One of the
EPL immediately articulates this policy, by pronouncing its purpose to be "to
protect and improve the human environment and the ecological environment,
prevent and control pollution and other environmental hazards, safeguard
people's health and promote the development of socialist modernisation
[sic]."' 6
Environmental impact assessments and the "three synchronizations"
are two pollution control tools used to facilitate these goals. China's
environmental impact assessments, modeled after those used in Western
countries, aspire to promote environmental planning in the development
stage. 47  The "three synchronizations," or the three-at-the-same time
principle, is a preventative tool which requires that design, installation and
operation of prevention equipment coincide at the same time as project
construction. Production at a facility may not begin without the local
environmental bureau's approval of pollution control equipment.
48
of national and local environmental protection agencies. Second, each level of government is explicitly
responsible for environmental protection. Third, several programs, such as the discharge permit system, the
environmental responsibility system, and centralized pollution control system, are granted a statutory basis under
the 1989 version. Fourth, criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions are established. Id
42 Ross, supra note 23, at 30. Qu Geping, head of the Environment and National Resources Protection
Committee of the National People's Congress, announced in March of 1994 that his committee would present 14
new amendments or laws to tighten environmental controls. Ross suggests that the State Council and other
administrative bodies are also likely to implement stricter regulations to enforce these statutes. Id
43 Hu Baolin, Basic Principles in Environmental Protection Law, in A COURSE IN CHINA's
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW 37 (Zhang Kunmin & Jin Ruilin eds., 1992).
41 Id. at 38-40.
41 Id. at 42.
46 EPL, supra note 39, at art. 1.
47 SINKuLE & ORTOLANO, supra note 41, at 31.
48 See Baolin, supra note 43, at 38-51 (discussing the three-at-the-same time provisions of the
EPL). See generally SINKuLE & ORTOLANO, supra note 41, at 31-32; Water Pollution Law Revised,
CHINAL. FOR Bus., July, 1996, at 4. The three-at-the-same-time program has had some success. China's
news agency reports that the program has been implemented at 87.3 percent of projects above the county
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Second, the EPL stresses pollution prevention, whether used
independently or in conjunction with remedial actions.49  Third, the EPL
places an emphasis on overall planning and rational layout.50 Fourth, the law
sets forth the "polluter pays" principle, meaning that those who pollute will
be held financially accountable for the consequent remedial actions
required. 51  Fifth, governments are held responsible for environmental
quality. 2  Finally, the EPL declares that environmental protection is both a
right and an obligation for all citizens. China to some degree relies on its
public to effectuate environmental protection.5 3  One scholar notes,
"[R]elying on the masses for environmental protection is the foundation of
China's environmental protection work. '5 4  Although the EPL applies to
environmental protection generally, its principles are particularly applicable to
water policy given the current water quality crisis.
The EPL has been criticized for containing loopholes which allow
entities and persons to escape environmental regulation and liability. 5 For
example, the technology provisions of Articles Thirty-Four and Thirty-Seven
may be interpreted to apply only to government work units (danwei),56 rather
than private enterprises. 7  Moreover, environmental goal-setting and
shutdown orders must be approved by local governments,58  which are
level. Environmental Protection in China, XINHUA, June 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Allnws file. However, it has been noted that there is a considerable amount of redundancy between the
EIA process and the three-at-the-same time program, which has the unintended effect of further straining
scarce environmental protection financing. SrNKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 41, at 190-91.
49 For example, Article 4 of the EPL calls for protection to be planned with economic development
for the purpose of prevention. Article 5 provides that the state "shall encourage the development of
education in the science of environmental protection. See generally Baolin, supra note 43, at 51-69
(discussing the pollution prevention provisions of the EPL).
50 See Baolin, supra note 43, at 69-80 (discussing planning provisions of the EPL).
s' EPL, art. 17-20. See also Baolin, supra note 43, at 80-89 (discussing the "polluter pays" principle).
52 EPL, arts. 9 & 10 (local standards), art 12 (governments above county level), art. 15 (negotiating
between jurisdictions), art. 17 (areas of rare value), art. 20 (agricultural environment), and arts. 13 & 29 (new
plants). See also Baolin, supra note 43, at 90-100 (discussing local government obligations within the EPL).
13 EPL, art. 4 (education), art. 6 (public participation), art. 11 (bulletins to the public). See
generally Baolin, supra note 43, at 100-106 (discussing public participation provisions of the EPL).
14 Baolin, supra note 43, at 101. But see infra notes 173-80, and accompanying text (discussing the
diminished role of campaigns in environmental protection).
55 Ross, supra note 23, at 31.
56 "Units" play a substantial role in Chinese society. Units are similar to firms, enterprises,
government offices, or other places of work. However, employment is only one function of a unit. Units
also provide housing, health care, permission to have children, and to change jobs. SiNKuLE &
ORTOLANO, supra note 41, at 13.
5' Ross, supra note 23, at 31. Article 34 refers to liability incurred by using polluting technologies,
while article 37 concerns disabling pollution controls. Id.
m' EPL, arts. 12, 39.
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frequently compromised by the push for profits. 59 This conflict of interest
reflects a systemic illness which has plagued effective water protection during
China's growth period.60
2. Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law ("WPL ")
The WPL is the chief law for protecting China's inland waters. As its
name indicates, the WPL emphasizes prevention. Each level of government,
from the State Council to municipalities, must include prevention strategies
within their plans.6 ' The Law applies to both surface and ground water.62
The Law authorizes the National Environmental Protection Agency
("NEPA") to set both national water quality standards, above which water
pollution levels must not exceed,63 and pollution discharge standards. 4 The
WPL also requires pollutant discharge registration 65 and the payment of
effluent fees.66 Effluent fees consist of a base fee for discharges at or below
permitted levels and an additional fee for exceeding local or national
standards. 67 The WPL is stricter than the EPL in this respect. 68  The WPL
grants governments above the county level the discretion to protect
designated areas for drinking water, aesthetic value, fishing, or other cultural
benefits. 69  For properly designated areas, higher quality standards can be
established.70 Other provisions of the WPL include compulsory emergency
measures, 71 on-site inspection allowances,72 and prohibited activities. Among
the activities prohibited is the discharge of various hazardous materials. 73
59 Ross, supra note 23, at 31.
60 See infra notes 186-94, and accompanying text.
61 WPL, art. 3.
62 Surface water bodies covered by the law include rivers, lakes, canals, reservoirs, irrigation
ditches, and other surface water bodies as well as groundwater. WPL, art. 2.
63 WPL, art. 6.
6' WPL, art. 7.
61 WPL, art. 14.
66 WPL, art. 15.
67 WPL, art. 15.
68 The EPL only requires charges for excesses of the standaid. Ross& St.c, supra note 38, at 128-29.
69 WPL, art. 12.
'0 WPL, art. 12.
" WPL, arts. 17, 20.
72 WPL, art. 18.
13 The WPL does not specifically define "hazardous materials." It does prohibit the discharge or
dumping of oil, acid, alkaline solutions, "deadly" toxic liquid waste, mercury, cadmium, arsenic,
chromium, lead, cyanide, yellow phosphorous, radioactive substances and "deadly" toxic soluble slag. See
WPL, arts. 21-26, 28-31.
JUNE 1998
PAcIIic RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
The strategy for prevention and control of water pollution is rapidly
changing. Three major changes are currently being implemented to prevent
industrial pollution and have been included in the recent amendments to the
WPL. First, the point source focus of control is giving way to a control
policy which focuses on entire production processes. 74 Second, concentration
controls for pollutant discharges will emphasize total quantity of pollutant
loading as well as the traditional parameter of pollutant concentration. 75
Third, the scope of pollution control has been expanded from considering
only centralized sources to include non-point sources as well.76
On May 15, 1996, the WPL was amended in several significant ways.
First, the WPL adopted the EPL's three-at-the same-time language for water
pollution prevention projects.77 Second, environmental impact reports now
must include the opinion of local environmental officials.78 Third, the
amendments tighten technology standards by requiring businesses to use
clean production technologies which utilize raw materials more efficiently.79
The amended WPL requires environmental agencies to list inadequate water-
related technologies which are banned from manufacture, sale, and use. °
Fourth, clean-up efforts on major rivers are now to be undertaken as a whole,
rather than by the prior fragmented approach of multiple locality
management.8 1
Finally, the amendments enhance prior enforcement measures. For
example, a thousand ship fleet has been established for enforcement
purposes.82 Moreover, the amendments confer to the Ministry of Agriculture
the exclusive right to punish those who drain sewage into fish-breeding
areas.83 Fisheries serve as an important complement to agricultural resources,
particularly given the decline in agricultural acreage. The WPL
amendments reflect the increasing concern for better water quality held by
74 Environmental Protection in China, supra note 48. Point source pollution refers to end-of-the-
pipe discharges of production facilities. Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. Non-point pollution sources are those sources which are not by definition point sources, or
more generally, agricultural sources. Id.
77 Water Pollution Law Revised, supra note 48.
7s Id.
19 Id.
so Id.
" Ma Chenguang, Statute Broadens Lawyers' Powers Law Will Also Screen, Monitor Attorneys,
CHINADAILY, May 16, 1996, available at WESTLAW, CHDY database.
a' Wu Yunhe, supra note 14.
83 id.
s4 Id.
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national policy-makers. However, these changes and heightened concern
may not be a sufficient salve given China's questionable enforcement record.
III. ENFORCEMENT
Perhaps the most criticized element of China's water policy is its
enforcement structure.85  Enforcing Chinese environmental law is
accomplished by administrative regulations and controls, economic
incentives, legal sanctions, and exhortation campaigns.8 6 Campaigns and
administrative measures were the favored modes of enforcement in the past.
7
In recent years, decentralized administration controls and economic incentive
programs have gained new emphasis for fostering economic growth without
yielding local control.88 Even so, the cumulative benefit of these traditionally
used enforcement measures has proven inadequate.
89
A. Administrative Regulations and Controls
China utilizes a split, multi-tiered administrative structure to regulate
and enforce its water pollution laws. The State Council presides over two
separate types of environmental protection organizations: environmental
protection bureaus and offices; and environmental protection commissions.
90
The National People's Congress and the State Council make statutes and
administrative decrees which establish the overarching rules for bureaus and
commissions of all government levels to implement.
91
China's lead environmental protection bureau is NEPA.92 In 1987,
NEPA was given cabinet level status, and directed to oversee national
environmental protection efforts. 93  Subordinate bureaus at the provincial,
'" See supra note 21.
86 Ross & SiLK, supra note 38, at 207.
87 id.
"' Id. at 207-09.
89 See supra notes 1-2 1, and accompanying text.
9 SINKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 41, at 6-7.
91 Ross & SiLK, supra note 38, at 426-29. For instance, Article 37 of the WPL states that warnings
and fines should be given for actions such as failing to report or falsifying a discharge report; placing in
operation a construction project whose control equipment is either not certified or inoperable; and
dumping, abandoning, storing, or discharging a pollutant in violation of the law. Article 38 establishes
punishments for institutions or enterprises which fail to meet cleanup responsibilities and deadlines.
Article 39 establishes a dual punishment system which punishes the unit, and when suitably serious,
individual violators. WPL, arts. 37-39.
92 SINKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 41, at 6.
93 id.
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city, county, district and town level implement national statutes and
regulations, and act as the enforcement agencies of NEPA.94 Their duties
include monitoring, fee-collecting, and record keeping.95 Bureaus exist under
two separate authorities: NEPA and their local government. 96  Bureau
-activities are funded by their respective local governments, and bureau
directors serve at the discretion of the local government head. 97 This split of
authority can force local bureaus to balance their regulatory roles with the
conflicting economic concems of local governments.
98
Environmental protection commissions are independent organizations
from environmental protection bureaus, but are also subject to State Council
control.99 Commissions coordinate environmental protection efforts amongst
government entities. 100  The State Council's State Commission on
Environmental Protection is China's lead commission. It meets quarterly to
identify issues and settle disputes between national ministries. 1° 1  The
Commission, led by the Vice-Premier, consists of representatives of twenty-
five national ministries. 0 2 Together with NEPA, the ministries issue national
regulations for water pollution control. These regulations are supplemented
by rules promulgated by provincial, municipal, and county environmental
commissions. 103 The level of efficacy for sub-national commissions varies.10 4
Many reasons have been posited to explain why national regulations
and controls at the national level have been ineffective. First, national water
pollution control laws have failed to keep pace with China's exponential
economic growth. 10 5 To encourage modernization, regional businesses were
allowed great discretion in expanding their production, which outpaced local
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id at 10.
97 Id.
9 Id. at 2. See infra notes 113-22, 187-96, and accompanying text for discussions on conflicts of
interest among enforcers.
99 SINKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 41, at 6-7.
'° Id. at 8.
101 Ross & SILK, supra note 38, at 426-27.
102 SINKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 41, at 8.
103 Ross & SILK, supra note 38, at 426-29. Article 10 of the EPL allows local governments to set
discharge standards for pollutants left unspecified at the national level. More stringent standards for
nationally specified standards must be set in coordination with higher level government agencies. EPL,
art. 10. Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the WPL provide for similar supplementation. WPL, arts. 6-8.
104 SINKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 41, at 8-9.
1 05 For example, only with the recent amendments has the three-at-the-same time policy of the EPL
been incorporated into the nation's WPL. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text for discussion on
the WPL amendments.
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environmental controls. 10 6  National standards lacked clarity to prevent
environmental damage,10 7  and enforcement was underfunded and
ineffective.108  Second, environmental administrative bodies have only
recently been recognized as equals to other administrative bodies. 109 For
example, the work of NEPA is in tension with other ministries whose goals
are primarily economic.110 To help alleviate administrative difficulties, the
national government created a series of national, trans-provincial, and
territorial plans."' National regulations were written in such a way as to
allow local administrations significant discretion to establish policies and
regulations which reflect the particular physical and socio-economic
characteristics of their region." 2
However, decentralizing environmental control is problematic. Local
governments have generally been slow to embrace environmental
regulation. 113  Local policy implementation is fragmented and disjointed,"14
and effective enforcement is often stymied by conflicting interests among
local regulators, similar to the national level. "In many cases, owners or
managers of heavy polluting factories are senior local government officials or
have contacts that make them hard to prosecute."'" 5 Local governments have
also been less than willing to enforce water pollution laws that detrimentally
impact their revenue generation. 16 Moreover, local environmental protection
bureaus frequently issue regulations in cooperation with other government
offices, thereby subjecting their discretion to interagency politics.' '1
'06 See Ross & SILK, supra note 38, at 207. See also Bachner, Regulating Pollution, supra note 21,
at 381.
107 Hon S. Chan et al., The Implementation Gap in Environmental Management in China: The Case
of Guangzhou, Zhengzhou, and Nanjing, 55 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 333, 337 (1995) (discussing survey
findings which showed 42 percent of regulators felt they "[Liacked a clear set of rules and technical
support"). One scholar states that "environmental policy in China, regrettably, remains unclear," and that
it is "ambiguous, and as yet, unsubstantiated .. " Bachner, Coming Home, supra note 20, at 644.
'08 See Chart et al., supra note 107, at 337; see also SMIL, supra note 6, at 2.
109 See, e.g., SINKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 41, at 6 (discussing the Environmental Protection
Administration's ascendancy to cabinet level status).
110 Bachner, Coming Home, supra note 20, at 645.
Environmental Protection in China, supra note 48.
112 Chan et al., supra note 107, at 336. In the Guangdong Province, citizens say "the heavens are
high and the emperor is far away." SINKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 41, at 13. This reflects the local
attitude towards decisions made in Beijing.
113 Chan et al., supra note 107, at 337; see also Hucheon, supra note 5.
114 SINKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 41, at 12-13.
"' Di Cicco, supra note 5.
116 See Hucheon, supra note 5 (discussing flouting of rules and regulations by local governments
eager to partake in China's economic growth binge).
117 SINKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 41, at 15-17.
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In addition, even though the EPL contains provisions to eliminate
conflicts of interest and illegal practices, 118 corruption continues to be a
problem. 19 Corruption is a substantial threat in times of growth where
government officials earn substantially less than non-government workers, but
can offer the means to greater profits for non-government workers. 120  The
need to improve local enforcement and limit corruption has been well
articulated at the national level. Upon the 1993 implementation of
"Regulations on State Functionaries," Vice Premier Zhou Jiahua declared,
"[tihe Chinese government is determined to stamp out corruption . . ." and
that the Chinese government "attach[es] great importance to building a
spiritual civilization while building a material civilization." 121  Song Jian,
Director of the State Council's Environmental Protection Committee, recently
said, "efforts should be made in the coming five years to improve and strictly
enforce the laws and regulations, a must for the country to realize its 1996-
2000 environmental protection targets."' 22
Whether the national government's new sense of environmental
urgency can be successfully conveyed to local governments is uncertain. To
date, local regulators and producers have chosen short term gains in
production over the long-term protection of water quality and the
environment.
B. Economic Incentives
Pollution control enforcement has increasingly utilized economic
incentives. Incentive approaches are attractive to environmental policy
makers given the successes other market reform mechanisms have had upon
the Chinese economy. 123 The economic approach to regulation finds part of
118 EPL, art. 45.
119 King Tsao & John Worthley, Chinese Public Administration: Change with Continuity during
Political and Economic Development, 55 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 169, 171-72 (1995).
120 Tsao & Worthley, supra note 119, at 171.
121 Id. The regulations on state functionaries may be viewed as akin to the United State's original
Civil Service Act (the Pendleton Act of 1883, 22 Stat. 403, codified as amended throughout Title 5 of the
U.S.C.), which reformed public administration policies from its prior spoils system. Id.
12 China Vows To Beef Up Efforts To Enforce Environmental Laws, XINHUA, July 17, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws file. The environmental protection targets aim to halt the
current trends of pollution and biological damage, and to make specific remedial efforts in some cities and
regions. Id. Priority has been given to the prevention and control of water pollution. Id.
123 Bachner, Regulating Pollution, supra note 21, at 392. China adopted several market
mechanisms in the early 1980s which reflect its recent shift towards a laissez-faire economy. For
example, China set up stock exchanges, allowed foreign investment, and listed Chinese companies on
foreign exchanges. Id. at 381. The underlying goal behind these changes was to allow state-run
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its validity among legislators because it mirrors successful Western regulatory
models. 124 The WPL's two-tiered effluent fee system exemplifies the
economic approach to pollution control. It attempts to invoke the "polluter
pays" principle, thereby creating a disincentive to pollute. The failures of the
effluent fee system as an enforcement tool can be traced to at least three
implementation problems.
First, fees do not begin to equate to the marginal cost of the
pollution. 125 When effluent fees are too small, they fail to accurately account
for the social costs of water pollution.' 26 Social costs, otherwise known as
externalities, include difficult to quantify values like natural resource
damages, chronic illnesses, and aesthetic harms. 12 7  Pricing mechanisms
which fail to account for externalities must be supplemented by some other
means of pollution control, 128 but when the other basic modes of enforcement
are ineffective, water pollution problems stand uncorrected. Moreover,
underpricing effluent fees subverts the "polluter pays" principle. Typically,
fees cost less than the actual cost of waste treatment. 29 Hence, it is less
expensive for polluters to pay fees than it is to take actions to lessen their
pollution. If fees are not large enough to create sufficient disincentives to
polluters, they serve more as nuisances than deterrents.
Second, the ability to collect fees varies considerably. Fee amounts are
subject to bargaining and negotiating, which creates regional disparities in the
implementation of the effluent fee system. 130 In addition, when dischargers
refuse to pay fees, local environmental protection departments are frequently
unable to force payment.' 3'
Third, water pollution control models which emphasize protection by
disincentive may be less effective in China than in more developed countries
because of fundamental socio-economic differences and other institutional
disparities. Although some have argued for the transplanting of Western
companies greater freedom in making business decisions. Id; see also SINKULE & ORToLANo, supra note
41, at 20 (describing a duel price system which permits goods produced above target amounts to be sold at
market prices rather than at lower prices established by the state).124 Bachner, Regulating Pollution, supra note 21, at 373.
125 Ross & SILK, supra note 38, at 208.
126 Bachner, Regulating Pollution, supra note 21, at 392-93.
127 ld. at 393-94.
128 Cf., Ross& SILK, supra note 38, at 208.
129 SINKuLE & ORToLANo, supra note 41, at 32.
130 Id. at 33.
131 Ross& SILK, supra note 38, at 131. Article 37 of the WPL allows enforcers to impose additional
fines and issue warnings against those who refuse to pay effluent fees. WPL, art. 37.
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water pollution control models into the Chinese regulatory system, 132 such
models need to be considered in the context of a developing country rather
than a developed country. 133  For example, one socio-economic difference
between more developed countries and China is the government's relation
with corporations. Chinese corporations are often partially or wholly owned
by the government.' 134 Effluent charges are meant to work in the context of
competition, thus creating a disincentive to pollute. However, when
corporations are substantially subsidized by the government, effluent fees
become less effective as economic disincentives because the profit motive
and competition are lacking.
135
C. Legal Responsibility
Traditionally, courts are not the favored provider of dispute resolutions
in China. 13 6 Over ninety percent of the actions of environmental officials are
accepted without further ado.' 37 The remaining actions are typically settled
through a mediation of the regulators, the polluters, and the victims.' 38 When
conflicts do find their way into courts, they usually involve major pollution
hazards near large cities. 139  However, in these cases, pollution control is
hindered by the courts' typical issuance of low penalties, which fail to have a
deterrent effect upon polluters, and fail to equate with the seriousness of the
violations. 140 Thus, although the WPL and EPL establish a strict liability
system for injuries and losses caused by polluters, 141 the use of civil and
criminal liability measures for water pollution control is rare. 
142
112 See, e.g., Ross & SILK, supra note 38, at 62 (discussing experimentation of with Western-like
effluent fee and fines).
133 Bachner, Coming Home, supra note 20, at 637-41.
134 Id. at 647.
' Id. at 647-48.
136 SINKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 41, at 156. The authors offer several reasons for the
infrequent use of courts. First, from 1966-1976, few courts operated due to the Cultural Revolution. Id.
This period also saw a lack of growth in legal institutions generally. Id. Second, Chinese culture
emphasizes the fostering of interpersonal relationships. Id. Court resolutions are seen as counter-
productive to developing such relationships. Id. Third, environmental protection bureaus frequently do
not have legal counsel. Id. Fourth, if a state-owned company is not profitable, it may be impossible to
enforce a favorable ruling. Id.
137 Ross & SILK, supra note 38, at 243.
138 id.
139 Cf., SINKULE & ORTOLAN'O, supra note 41, at 156.
140 Fiona Holland, Battle for Pure Air, Clean Water, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 1, 1997,
available in LEXIS, Asiap library, Allnews file.
141 See infra notes 143-48, and accompanying text.
142 SNKULE& ORTOLANO, supra note 41, at 156.
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Under the WPL's civil liability provisions, polluters are strictly liable
to units and individuals which have "directly suffered losses" from the
harm(s) caused by their actions.1 43  Once a water pollution hazard is
recognized, polluters must eliminate it and compensate those who suffered
losses.144 Article Forty-One of the WPL suggests that adverse parties submit
compensation issues to the competent environmental protection department
for settlement. This is not a requirement; parties may take their dispute
directly to a people's court. Further, parties may appeal agency decisions on
liability to court.145 The WPL provides three major exceptions to findings of
civil liability. First, third parties are responsible for the intentional or
negligent water pollution losses they cause. 146  Second, units are not
responsible for pollution caused by the victims.1 47 Third, unavoidable natural
calamities which cause water pollution are considered superseding causes
sufficient to nullify liability.1
48
Criminal liability may attach where an intentional or negligent violation
of the law creates a major water pollution accident which seriously threatens
public health or private property. 149 In such instances, the WPL provides that
person(s) responsible may be investigated by application of Article 115 or
187 of the Criminal Law.5 °  Article 115 applies to major violations
concerning the handling of hazardous articles, such as combustibles,
explosives, poisons, corrosives, and radioactive materials, and establishes a
maximum sentence for violations of seven years. 151 Article 187 establishes a
maximum five year term for state personnel whose neglect cause major losses
143 WPL, arts. 5, 41. Article Five establishes the possibility for units and individuals for recovering
direct damages from water pollution damage. Article 41 focuses on the liability of the polluter. For a
description of the meaning of"unit," see supra note 49. Cf EPL, art. 41 (using parallel language).
14 WPL, art. 41.
141 WPL, art. 41. Although the use of environmental protection departments as arbiters is not a
requirement, the statute's inclusion of this resolution mode further evinces the Chinese aversion to using
its judiciary for such disputes.
146 WPL, art. 41.
141 WPL, art. 41.
141 WPL, art. 42.
149 WPL, art. 43.
so WPL, art. 43. Cf EPL, art 43, (using parallel language, but without specific references to the Criminal
Law). See also Yang Chun-Xi et al., China's Treatment of Crimes Against the Environment: Using Criminal
Sanctions to Fight Environmental Degradation in the PRC, 8 J. CHINESE L. 145, 172-74 (1994) (discussing the
two forms of culpability---purposeful and negligent-in Chinese environmental law).
1' Zonghua Remnin Gongheguo Minfa Tongzi [Criminal Law of The People's Republic Of China]
(1979) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter CRIMINAL LAW], art. 115, translated in 1 STATUTES AND REGULATIONS OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1987) (compiled by The Institute of Chinese Law).
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of property or to the interests of the people. 52 Similarly, Article Forty-Five
of the EPL states,
Any person conducting supervision and management of
environmental protection who abuses his power, neglects his
duty or engages in malpractices for personal gains shall be given
administrative sanction by the unit to which he belongs or the
competent higher authorities; if his act constitutes a crime, he
shall be investigated for criminal responsibility according to the
law. 153
Criminal responsibility may be reduced or eliminated by the defenses of
necessity, 114 irresistibility, 5 and excuse. 156
The Criminal Law has recently been amended to address certain crimes
against the environment. Article 338 of the Criminal Law now states that the
discharge, disposal, or dumping of harmful wastes, defined as wastes that are
radioactive, infectious, pathogenic, toxic, or otherwise dangerous to public or
private property and human health, should be punished with years of
imprisonment. 157 The Law also makes it a punishable offense to import waste
for dumping, storage, or disposal.158  Finally, environmental officials who
allow serious pollution accidents to occur through dereliction of their duties
may be sentenced to prison under the amended Criminal Law. 15 9 Effective
October 1, 1997,160 it remains to be seen what impact the amended provisions
will have on water pollution control.
152 Article 187 of the Criminal Law states, "State personnel who, because of neglect of duty, cause
public property or the interests of the state and the people to suffer major losses are to be sentenced to not
more than five years of fixed-term imprisonment or criminal detention."
' EPL, art. 45.154 Necessity refers to a harm to the environment which is necessarily caused to avert a danger to the
immediate public interest. CRIMINAL LAW, art. 18.
155 Irresistibility refers to superseding causes such as acts of God. CRIMINAL LAW, art. 13.
156 The defense of excuse allows defendants to mitigate their punishments through several means,
such as explaining the circumstances of their crime, voluntarily discontinuing a crime, and limiting the
harm of a crime. See Chun-Xi et al., supra note 150, at 175-76.
' Amended Criminal Law to Punish Polluters, XINHuA, Apr. 10, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Allows file.
'58 Id. In recent years, almost twenty cases of importing hazardous solid wastes from abroad have
been reported in China. Id.
159 Id.
160 id.
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Despite these positive measures, the Criminal Law provisions contain
large gaps which weaken their effectiveness. 161  For example, corporate
entities generally are not criminally accountable for their environmental
crimes.' 62  In fact, polluting corporations are described as the
"untouchables.' ' 163 Another significant gap is that the legal system does not
convey criminal liability for acts that indirectly degrade major water
bodies. 164  Legal issues may therefore arise over the distinction between
direct and indirect harms. Finally, criminal provisions ordinarily only apply to
"serious injuries" or "heavy losses," which themselves are terms subject to
interpretation. 1
65
Several arguments can be made for an increased use of the legal
system. First, the use of the judiciary may tend to mitigate the conflicts of
interest between the regulators and the regulated by allowing a judge to settle
disputes. 166  Second, courts and government authorities have become much
more cognizant of the gravity of pollution and therefore rule in favor of the
environment more frequently. 167 Third, victims are more likely to gain the full
value of recompense when a dispute is litigated. 168 Finally, the public nature
of the litigation will increase public awareness, 169 which may in turn deter
facilities from polluting. A positive sign in this respect are reports that China
uses the news media to increase awareness of environmental lawbreaking
activities. 170
Notwithstanding these arguments in favor of greater legal involvement,
it is unlikely that China's legal system will play the prominent role in water
policy reform. Environmental protection bureaus have been recalcitrant in
161 According to China's government news agency, "China's environmental legal system needs to be
further unproved. For instance, some areas still remain uncovered by law, the contents of some laws are yet to be
increased or revised and there are still the cases of not fully observing or enforcing laws." Environmental
Protection in China, supra note 48. Some changes, such as the aforementioned Criminal Law amendments,
have taken place; others may be imminent Comments by officials indicate the likelihood of this development
For instance, Song Jian, director of the legislature's environmental committee said, "Violators should be
punished as severely as smugglers and drug traffickers." Tempest, supra note 4. One leading official has even
suggested that the death penalty should apply to polluters. Id See also Polluter Beware, supra note 1, at 12
(reporting that severe environmental pollution may carry the death penalty).
162 Chun-Xi et al., supra note 150, at 164-66.
163 Vincent Cheng Yang, Note, Punishing For Environmental Protection?-Enforcement Issues in
China, 44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 671, 677 (1995).
16 Chun-Xi et al., supra note 150, at 170-71.
161 Id. at 169-70.
166 Ross & SILK, supra note 38, at 209.
167 Id.
1'6 Id. at 248.
169 Id. at 246-47.
17 Environmental Protection in China, supra note 48.
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avoiding courts, preferring not to relinquish their power, except in the most
non-negotiable instances. 171 Instead, bureaus, and Chinese citizens as well,
prefer to develop harmonious relationships which preclude the necessity of
formal, adversarial confrontations.' 72 Thus, courts are used as a last resort,
after all other administrative remedies are exhausted. 1
73
D. Campaigns
Mobilizing the masses has traditionally been China's favorite tool for
social change. Campaigns are organized by the Communist Party and attempt
to combat pollution problems by using many citizens in activities such as tree-
plantings or cleanup activities. 174 However, enforcement by way of campaign
has proven less effective more recently because campaigns are too "simplistic
and politically colored for most environmental policies.' 175  For example,
toxic waste cleanups do not lend themselves to public cleanups due to their
complexity and hazardous nature. Campaigns have also come into disfavor
for environmental protection purposes because their focus is typically
remedial rather than preventive. 176
Citizen participation can still play a significant role in environmental
protection, despite the decline in use of campaigns. Citizen participation is
currently considered a nominal part of environmental protection in China, but
this is likely to change as market forces continue to change Chinese society as
a whole. 177 The statutory bases for increased citizen involvement in water
quality protection can be found in both the EPL and WPL. Article Five of the
EPL directs the state to "popularize scientific knowledge of environmental
protection.' 178 Article Six of the EPL states that "All . . .individuals shall
have the obligation to protect the environment .... , Article Five of the
WPL includes identical language.' 80 Experts predict that the citizen's role in
1 SINKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 41, at 155.
172 Id. at 156.
173 Brian Baillie, Hong Kong University of Law professor, is one critic of the tendency to treat
prosecution as a last resort for environmental violations: "The Government pays lip-service only to its
own standards and powers. Its rhetoric about environmental care is just that - rhetoric." Holland, Battle
for Pure Air, Clean Water, supra note 140.
174 Past campaigns have been aimed at concerns such as corruption, rightist views, crime, and public
health and sanitation. Ross & SILK, supra note 38, at 207.
175 id.
176 Id.
... SINKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 41, at 202
17 EPL, art. 5,.
179 EPL, art. 6.
"0 WPL, art. 5.
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environmental protection will grow as the economy shifts to a market-based
economy.1
8 1
IV. MOVING BEYOND RHETORIC
Sustainable development is the mantra of China's pollution prevention
plans. "Sustainable development" refers to the concept that economic growth
can occur contemporaneously with sufficient care for the perpetual well-being
of the environment. 8 2  The Constitution, EPL, and WPL each contain
language which evince sustainable water policies. 183 Moreover, in 1994, the
State Council approved an ambitious plan for sustainability called "Agenda
21 ."184 Agenda 21 is a fifteen year program which will attempt to allow the
Chinese economy to grow while still protecting the environment.1
8 5
There is just call for pessimism. China has a long history of
environmental concern and legislation, 186 and the future impact of the recent
flurry in water pollution control legislation and regulation is unknown. Many
of the steps China has taken at the legislative level will likely have a positive
effect on water quality. To effectuate sustainable development, water quality
protection must outpace China's exponential economic growth. Anything
E.g., EDMONDS, supra note 1, at 18.182 Environmental theorists argue over the precise definition for "sustainable development" Such
arguments may be important given the self-fulfilling effect they can have upon developing countries such as
China, which include the phrase in their planning. The World Conservation Union, the United Nations
Environment Programme, and the World Wide Fund for Nature defined sustainable development as "the
management of human use of the biosphere so that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to present
generations while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations." Shridath
Ramphal, Sustainable Development, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENVIRONMENT 680, 680 (Ruth A. Eblen &
William R Eblen, eds., 1994). In 1991, these same groups defined the term as "improving the quality of human
life while living within the carrying capacity of supporting ecosystems." Id Compare this with the World
Commission on Environment and Development's definition: "[D]evelopment that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Id.
183 E.g., P.R.C. CONST. of 1982, art. 27, ("The state protects and improves the environment in which
people live and the ecological environment."); EPL, art. 10 (National pollutant discharge standards are to
be formulated "in accordance with State environment quality standards and State economic and
technological requirements."); WPL, art. I("'This Law is formulated for the purpose of preventing and
controlling water pollution, ... and facilitating the development of socialist modernization.").
184 "China's 21st Century Agenda" for the Environment, BBC, Oct. 31, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, ALLNWS file. See also Environmental Protection in China, supra note 48.
185 The program establishes 62 priority projects to be dealt with in China's Ninth Five-Year Plan
(1996-2000). Many of the projects target water pollution problems, such as the development of integrated
water management in the Jingsha urban area ($56.4 million), promoting conservation of Bosteng Lake in
Xinjiang ($11.12 million), and the promotion of a water reclamation industry ($25.8 million). Wither
China's Environment?, supra note 1, at 24-28.
'86 See generally EDMONDS, supra note 1, at 22-41, 228-34 (discussing the history of environmental
policy in China).
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less will fail to span the current gap between protection and growth. For this
to happen, China will need to move beyond the legislative rhetoric of
sustamability and into effective water policy implementation. Although not
exclusive, some overarching starting points for improving water pollution
control follow.
A. Eliminate Conflicts of Interest
Although the rhetoric of sustainability has been within Chinese
environmental law since the drafting of the first EPL in 1979, pollution
problems continue to worsen. 187 Article One of both the EPL and the WPL
recognize the importance of "safeguarding human health" while promoting
"socialist modernization." However, reality has shown that conflicts of
interest favoring "socialist modernization" exist at both the national and local
enforcement levels. 188 These conflicts must be dispelled for China to reach
its water policy goals. If China's water quality is to significantly improve
anytime soon, socialist modernization and water quality must become
partners-rn-practice, as well as partners-in-theory.
While national conflicts of interest are diminishing as pollution control
crises gain the increased attention of legislators and regulators, local conflicts
of interest persist. 189 A recent survey of local environmental officials sheds
light on some of the underlying reasons for less than effective water policy
enforcement. 190 Surprisingly, twenty-six percent of the regulators surveyed
did not believe environmental protection was the responsibility of the
governnent1 91 Seventy-one percent of the field regulators surveyed were
strongly opposed to diminishing other governmental services to increase
funding for environmental protection. 92 Fifty-eight percent felt effluent fees
cover most related protection expenses.' 93 This last finding may be indicative
of the perceived need to maintain their "political rent." Field regulators are
187 Hucheon, supra note 5. See generally notes 1-21 and accompanying text for discussion on
China's pollution problems.
188 See supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text for discussion on conflict of interest problems.
189 See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text for discussion on the increased focus on
environmental problems by national legislators.
190 Chan et al., supra note 107. The survey's sample group was drawn from regulators within
various levels of the Guangzhou, Nanjing, and Zengzhou environmental protection agencies. The
individual surveys lasted approximately 80 minutes and a total of 181 out of 620 bureaucrats responded to
the survey. Id. at 336.
191 Id. at 337.
192 id.
193 Id. at 338.
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financially dependent upon effluent fees to maintain their environmental
protection functions. 94 Consequently, their survival, far from independent,
depends upon the continuance of undesirable activities. This survey thus
indicates that local environmental regulators hold significant vested interests
in China's economic growth rate, and thus have trouble balancing protection
efforts against their own self-interests.
Until local regulators dispose of their conflicts of interest and turn their
focus from economic growth, legislative efforts will be ineffectual. One
scholar believes that "environmental constraints will soon affect China's
economic growth.. . They have already begun to affect quality of life." 195 Qu
Geping, chairman of the NPC Environmental and Resources Protection
Committee, predicts that once living standards for the Chinese people
increase, the public demand for environmental quality will likewise
increase.1 96 Perhaps local regulators will be influenced by such a change in
public attitude.
B. Favor Absolutist Water Policies
Sustainable water policy can be achieved more quickly by de-
emphasizing economic solutions in favor of absolutist water quality policies.
Although effluent fee systems contain the potential to act as deterrents and
inspire action on the part of polluters, they have not done so in China.
Effluent fees and other economic regulatory instruments should not be
stressed as the present solution to China's water quality problems. Instead,
more authoritative regimes which favor command-and-control regulation
should be utilized, while maintaining economic incentive programs, public
participation, and the legal system as supplemental programs.
China's water quality problems are both present and severe.
Command-and-control regulations, if properly enforced, may result in
immediate enhanced water quality. Bright-line rules promulgated by the
national government will give local governments less opportunity to falter in
their environmental protection efforts due to conflicts of interest. Although a
complete centralization of regulatory authority is neither feasible nor
desirable, 197 the national government can provide greater clarity and
194 Id
195 Tempest, supra note 4.
196 Chenguang, supra note 5.
'9' It has been reported that provincial governors have already rejected an attempt to recentralize
power in the national government. Bachner, Regulating Pollution, supra note 21, at 384.
JUNE 1998
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
substance in rulemaking by establishing more stringent, non-discretionary
water quality standards. 198 Since policy outputs are largely a function of the
amount of discretion accorded to local regulators, 199 limiting their discretion
in the bargaining and negotiating phase of effluent fee enforcement should
positively impact water quality. In turn, a positive impact upon the present
water quality crisis can be hoped for.
A stronger national environmental management infrastructure is also
needed to help implement tighter standards. 200  NEPA must be accorded
power equivalent to other ministries.20' Cooperation and coordination
between the many national ministries involved in environmental protection
will result in clearer, non-conflicting directives. 20 2  In the aforementioned
survey, seventy-five percent of regulators agreed that the best solution to
China's environmental problems is "improving executive power and
management., 20 3  Without improvements in the national management
structure, local regulators will be less likely to enforce more stringent
standards successfully.
The need to implement absolutist policies is supported by the
precautionary and the preventative principles.204  The theme behind both
these principles is: when in doubt, protect. The precautionary principle
states that "[e]nvironmental measures should anticipate and prevent sources
of pollution. Scientific uncertainty should not excuse an effort to reduce a
threat of ecological deterioration." 20 5 The preventative principle, applicable
to new industries, calls for governments to prevent pollution by maintaining
risk-averse policies.20 6 Given the current water crisis and future uncertainty,
regulation and enforcement in accord with these principles should be
implemented without delay.
Economic instruments should be de-emphasized because they are poor
regulatory tools for public goods such as clean water.20 7 Chinese citizens
depend on the government to guarantee water quality, and have little recourse
1? See supra note 107 and accompanying text for discussion of problems with current rules.
199 Chan et al., supra note 107, at 336.
200 EDMONDS, supra note 1, at 255-56.
201 Id.
202 id.
203 Chan et al., supra note 107, at 338.
204 The deputy director of the Environmental Protection Committee's Legislative Division Office
recently included these principles in a plan for sustainable development. Bachner, Regulating Pollution,
supra note 21, at 379.
20 Id. at 379 n.37.
'" Id. at 379 n.38.
207 LESTER W. MILBRATH, ENVISIONING A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 25 (1989).
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in the market to insure water quality on their own. Economic regulatory
schemes are also problematic in times of scarcity, as is the current situation
for water quality in China.20 8 Those who cannot afford to pay for clean water
are left out of the market without recourse. Since the government has a duty,
as articulated in the Constitution, the EPL, and the WPL, to safeguard human
health, control water pollution, and provide effective use of water resources,
it should supplement effluent fees with greater substantive protection. Bright
line rules properly enforced promise increased efficiency for insuring
immediate returns of cleaner water.
Moreover, effluent fees fail to account adequately for present and
future social costs as evidenced by the current status of China's water quality.
It has already been shown that the pricing mechanisms of effluent fees fail to
approximate the real cost of pollution,20 9 and are sometimes hard to collect.21 0
As a general rule, markets are not efficiently anticipatory because the
demands of future generations can only marginally be calculated into current
211prices. These obstacles may be overcome through better pricing
mechanisms, but in the meantime, citizens and the environment suffer.
Command-and-control management can be more effective if it is
supplemented by other traditional modes of enforcement. For instance,
marketing water pollution permits can create incentives for better technology
and thus enhance water quality.2 12 Such a system is dependent on the strict
enforcement of present water quality standards. Consumer demand can also
prompt pollution prevention and control. For example, China has begun a
system of eco-labeling which may ultimately benefit water quality.213 Eco-
labeling is the practice of labeling specified products as environmentally
friendly. The primary benefit of an eco-labeling program is that it creates an
incentive for producers to use less hazardous materials in their production in
their effort to heed consumer demand for environmentally benign products.214
Eco-labeling can also serve the secondary function of enhancing
environmental awareness amongst consumers.215 Finally, the legal system
20" Id. at 24.
209 See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
210 SINKULE & ORTOLANO supra note 130; see also Ross & SILK supra note 131.
211 MILBRATH, supra note 207, at 23.
212 Chan et al., supra note 107, at 336.
213 Environmental Protection in China, supra note 48. By 1996, China's labeling program had
certified eleven categories of products for labeling, and thirty-five products had been awarded labels. Id.214 Jacqueline Welch, Malaysia Amends Environmental Law, ASIA L., July-Aug. 1996, at 37, 39.
215 Environmental Protection in China, supra note 48.
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can supplement command-and-control regulation by deterring major polluters
from their actions with the threat of large civil liability and criminal sanctions.
C. Increase Funding for Cleanups and Limit Future Costs
Even if all needed laws were in place, and all conflicts of interest were
defused, China's efforts to clean and sustain its water resources could fail for
lack of funding.2 16 By the year 2000, China will raise its funding for
environmental protection from the present rate of .7-.8 to 1.5 percent of the
gross domestic product.217  It is also reported that China is committed to
spending $21.6 billion on environmental protection between 1996 and
2000.218 This is not enough. A recent study of the economic costs of
environmental problems in China estimated that the annual cost of pollution is
as high as between ten and fifteen percent of the gross domestic product.2 19
Just to maintain the status quo over the next five years, NEPA estimates that
China must spend seventy billion dollars. 220  Remedial costs will require
additional financial resources.22 1
The source of the immense funds needed to clean China's waters is
unclear. For example, the estimated cost of the Huaihe River cleanup is $1.8
billion dollars.222 Local governments and businesses are expected to ante up
$590 million dollars, but their ability and will to pay remains questionable.22 3
NEPA will be expected to provide the remaining $1.2 billion dollars, but the
216 Wither China's Environment?, supra note 1.
211 Chenguang, supra note 5.
218 China To Invest 2) Billion Dollars in Environmental Projects, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 20,
1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File. See also Tempest, supra note 4 (reporting at an
earlier date an allocation of $23 billion for environmental projects over the same period).
219 SMIL, supra note 6, at 2. The World Bank reports the total cost of air and water pollution as
$53.6 billion per year, or eight percent of the gross domestic product. Environment: Counting the Cost,
19 CHINA ECON. REV., Dec. 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
220 Hucheon, supra note 5. Zhang Kunin, deputy administrator of NEPA, stated in a symposium that
China will spend billions between 1996 and 2000 to clean its water bodies. China To Pour Huge Funds Into
Cleaning PollutedRivers, XINHUA, Oct. 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File.221 Id.
222 Di Cicco, supra note 5. The 625 mile Huaihe River is located in east China's Anhui province.
The water is polluted to the point that it is unsuitable for agriculture. Id. The primary sources of
pollution for the valleys have been from factories such as paper mills, chemical plants, electroplating
factories, tanneries, and breweries, many of which have been shut down. Pollution Control in Huaihe,
Chaohu Valleys Fruitful, XuNtuA, Aug. 28, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File. The
Huaihe flows through Bengbu City, which has a population of 700,000. Id.
223 Di Cicco, supra note 5.
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source of these funds is also unknown. Nonetheless, officials optimistically
project that by 2000, the water of the Huaihe will be clean.224
One potential source of funding is international aid. Financial aid
has been offered for discrete cleanup programs by institutions such as the
World Bank, the U.N. Development Fund, and the Asian Development
Bank. 225 For instance, the World Bank in 1997 loaned China ninety-five
million dollars for an environmental project in the Shandong Province.
226
Another example is the Chaohu Lake Valley cleanup, where China will
apply for a $137 million loan from the Asian Development Bank. 2 7 Japan
has helped finance several environmental projects in China, and may soon
grant funds to establish a network linking one hundred major Chinese
cities for the collection of data concerning air and water pollution. 228  A
troubling characteristic of international aid offered to date is that it has
generally been limited to solitary projects in specified towns or provinces.
While this aid is helpful, what is really needed is funding for ecosystem
oriented projects.229 This sort of international aid may be more likely in
the future, given that the World Bank has declared it crucial that China
improve environmental policy coordination through the establishment of
regional air and water quality authorities.23 °
Environmental taxes are another possible source of funds. Given
China's growth, money should be plentiful. In fact, the World Bank, in
urging such taxes, states, "[riapid economic growth makes clearer waters and
bluer skies more attainable" so long as environmentally-friendly policies are
in place.2 3' Nonetheless, many Chinese do not view water resource
protection as a legitimate exercise of government spending. Twenty-five
percent of field regulators surveyed were opposed to increased government
224 Pollution Control in Huaihe, Chaohu Valleys Fruitful, supra note 222. The Chaohu Lake
Valley, like the Huaihe River, is located in east China's Anhui province. Together, the two valleys
represent 54 percent of Anhui's landmass 65 percent of the province's population. Id
225 Di Cicco, supra note 5.
226 China Environment Project Gets Loan Front World Bank, ASIAN EcON. NEWS, Nov. 3, 1997,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File. This loan was earmarked for both air and water
pollution problems. Water quality will be aided by investments in wastewater facilities, water storage, and
water treatment. The total cost of the cleanup project is estimated as $217.8 million. Id.
227 Pollution Control in Huaihe, Chaohu Valleys Fruitful, supra note 222.
228 Japan to Help China with Environmental Protection, JAPAN EcoN. NEwswIRE, Aug. 29, 1997,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
229 Pollution Control in Huaihe, Chaohu Valleys Fruitful, supra note 222.
230 China Urged to Introduce Environment Taxes, Penalties, AsIAN ECON. NEWS, Sept. 22, 1997,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
231 id.
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expenditure if it meant a correlative tax increase. 232 Moreover, twenty-seven
percent were against transferring government funding from other development
23projects.   Although these survey results reflect a minority opinion, the
nature of the survey sample group is persuasive as to the general adversity to
financing remedial actions.
Conservation may be a source of "funds" for reducing future costs.
Conservation rests at the heart of the EPL and the WPL,234 but is presently
subverted by China's rapid economic growth. Successful implementation of
preventative policies can conserve resources, thereby reducing the cost of
remedial actions. Future economic demands, such as the growing need for
energy, will challenge China's intent to conserve. 235 In the meantime, current
laws should be more fully utilized to foster conservation and limit conflicts of
interest. For example, an incentive to conserve may result from the creation
of nature reserves. In 1994, the State Council established new regulations
governing the creation and maintenance of nature reserves.2 36 Reserves that
protect wetlands and their associated species can also effectively prevent
water pollution.237 Reserves foster an environmental ethic by providing
positive examples of protected environments.238 Expanding conservation
efforts helps actualize desirable preventative policies, which will have the
additional positive effect of limiting future costs of water quality protection.
232 Chan et al., supra note 107, at 337.
233 id.
234 Eg., EPL, art. 17 ('People's governments at all levels shall adopt measures to better protect and to
strictly prohibit damage of regions representative of . important water resource conservation areas .. "); WPL,
art 9 (requiring that integrated plans be made in the management of water resources "in order to sustain the
natural purification capacity of water bodies"). For a general discussion on conservation efforts in China, see
EDMONDS, supra note 1, at 193-211.
23' For instance, China needs to double its electric power generation by 2000. Eighty percent of
these power needs will be met with coal. The use of this much coal will in turn place a large stress on
China's water quality from its mining and the consequent acid rain produced in its use. Tempest, supra
note 4. China's "2 1st Century Agenda on the Environment" does list the development of pollution-free
coal excavating technology as one of its goals, but whether this can and will be done remains in question.
"China's 21" Century Agenda "for the Environment, supra note 184.
236 Once a nature reserve is created, production facilities are disallowed from establishing
themselves in core or buffer areas. Reserves may be proposed at the local level but are approved at the
national level. Any of several conditions qualify an area to be set aside as a nature reserve. For instance,
areas which contain concentrations of rare or endangered plants or animals qualify. Wetlands and inland
water bodies qualify if they have a special protection value. An area which is damaged, but may recover
with special protection, and is typical of a greater ecosystem in that area, may also qualify. If an area has
unique scientific or cultural value, it may be set aside as a reserve. Nature Reserves, CHINA LEGAL DEV.
BuLL. Vol. 1, Num. 4, 1995, at 32.
237 EDMONDS, supra note 1, at 194.
238 Id. at 204.
WA TER QUALITY PROTECTION IN CHINA
Future costs can also be lessened by involving the general public in
water resource protection. Community pollution control efforts can raise
citizen awareness of the needs and benefits of environmental protection.239
Although use of the conventional campaign has diminished in recent years,24°
the national government has strived to raise the public's environmental
consciousness. Media coverage has accelerated, as evidenced by more than
ten thousand articles on the environment since 1993.241 Annual events such
as World Environment Day, Tree Planting Day, and Love The Birds Week
have reportedly helped popularize resource protection.242 Educating the
public about the harms of pollution can only pay dividends for water quality.
Volunteer activities such as tree plantings can help restore streams quickly
and cost-effectively. Conservation at home produces obvious benefits, such
as lowered pollution and energy use. Raising the public's awareness and
participation in water resource protection serves the dual functions of
decreasing the cost of remedial efforts, and preventing future pollution.243
China's funding difficulties are a function of political awareness and
will. Cleanup efforts can be financed through international loans, China's
own tax base, or some alternative source. Future costs can be limited by
emphasizing sustainability through conservation and citizen involvement. The
current price tag for sustainability is high, but the costs of future growth
without pollution control are staggering.
V. CONCLUSION
The legal cornerstones for a successful water management system in
China have been laid, but the house is far from built. Enforcement continues
to be a problem. Until local regulators enforce water quality standards for the
long-term well being of water resources, economic interests will continue to
harm China's waterbodies. National policy-makers can encourage a long-
239 Benxi of the Liaoning Province became the focus of cleanup efforts over a decade ago. The city
is a major industrial base in the province, but had suffered "huge amounts of air and water pollution."
Four major rivers which ran through the city, as well as the groundwater, were dangerously polluted.
Cleanup efforts have been successful in raising water quality to national standards. In commending the
city, Li Peng, Former Premier of China, noted that residents of the city had improved their awareness of
the need for environmental protection. Liu Yinglang, City Sees Clear Skies, Clean Water, CHINA DAILY,
Aug. 19, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Chdy Database.
240 See supra notes 174-81, and accompanying text.
241 Ensviwonw Ppoiectwa in Chia, supa note 44.
242 id.
243 id.
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term view by eliminating conflicts of interest, implementing absolutist
regimes, and providing adequate funding.
Legislators have adopted the concept of sustainability. Song Jian,
director of the State Council's Environment Protection Committee, recently
declared, "In order to protect the fundamental interests and sustain economic
development, it is better to slow down the economic growth rate for the time
being, than harm the environment and natural resources." 244  However,
modernization, demographics, and the competition for a limited supply of
water all add to a very uncertain future. China has reached a crossroads for
water quality management. The effects of today's action or inaction will be
felt for years to come.
244 China Vows To Beef Up Efforts To Enforce Environmental Laws, supra note 122.
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